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There Is No Place Like Home: The Supreme Court’s
Refusal to Allow Searches of the Home Based on Disputed
Consent in Georgia v. Randolph
I. Introduction
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against unreasonable
government searches of their homes, persons, and property.1 Over the years,
the courts have equated “unreasonable” with “warrantless,” and have generally
required a warrant issued upon probable cause before law enforcement officers
may conduct a search.2 Nevertheless, several exceptions to this requirement
have emerged. One of the most commonly used exceptions covers searches
based upon voluntary consent of the individual whose home the police desire
to search.3 In United States v. Matlock,4 the United States Supreme Court
expanded this exception to allow searches based upon the consent of third
parties who share common authority over the property.5 The Court’s decision
in Matlock, however, left many lower courts speculating as to what limits, if
any, applied to the third-party consent exception. In Georgia v. Randolph,6 the
Supreme Court provided an answer, holding that searches based on third-party
consent violate the Fourth Amendment if a present co-occupant objects to the
search.7 This note argues that, although the Court drew a fine line in
distinguishing Randolph from its prior ruling in Matlock, the decision in
Randolph was justified because it upholds the general requirement for a search
warrant, protects the heightened expectation of privacy traditionally given to
the home, and provides police with a practical, bright-line rule.
Part II of this note discusses the history of the warrant requirement and the
development of the consent search exception leading to the Court’s decision
in Randolph. Part III addresses the facts and holding of Randolph, including
the rationale from the majority and dissenting opinions. Part IV analyzes how
the Court’s ruling upholds traditional Fourth Amendment privacy rights, while
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970); Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 103, 107
(1965); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S.
452, 464 (1932).
3. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219; Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 630 (1946);
Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946).
4. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
5. Id. at 169-70.
6. 547 U.S. 103 (2006).
7. Id. at 122-23.
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also examining the Court’s failure to address the critical issue of whether Janet
Randolph possessed authority to consent to the search of the bedroom. Part
V discusses the possible impact of this decision on lower courts and law
enforcement. This note will conclude in Part VI.
II. Development of the Law Before Georgia v. Randolph
A. Searches and the General Requirement of Warrants
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects
individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures of their persons,
houses, papers, and effects.8 The seminal case in Fourth Amendment privacy
rights is the Supreme Court case of Katz v. United States.9 In Katz, the Court
held that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he
seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected.”10 Justice Harlan’s concurrence, which evolved into
the rule, articulated a two-pronged test for determining when government
action amounts to a search that invokes an individual’s Fourth Amendment
privacy rights.11 The first prong of the test states that an individual must have
exhibited an actual, subjective expectation of privacy.12 The second prong
requires that the expectation must be one that society is prepared to recognize
as reasonable.13 A search invokes Fourth Amendment scrutiny only when the
government infringes upon an expectation of privacy that passes both prongs
of the test.14 Although the Constitution does not expressly require a warrant
for a search to be reasonable, the Court presumes that “a search conducted
without a warrant issued upon probable cause is per se unreasonable.”15
Accordingly, the Court has generally found warrantless searches
unconstitutional.16
The Court adopted the exclusionary rule specifically to deter
unconstitutional searches by police officers.17 The exclusionary rule prohibits
8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
9. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
10. Id. at 351 (citations omitted).
11. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 353 (majority opinion).
15. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
16. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
17. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-56 (1961), overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949), and Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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the prosecution from introducing evidence obtained as a result of an illegal
search.18 Because the Constitution does not explicitly call for the exclusion of
evidence, the exclusionary rule exists as a judicially created method of
deterring Fourth Amendment violations.19 In theory, the threat of excluding
incriminating evidence destroys the motivation for police to conduct unlawful
searches.20 The exclusionary rule, first articulated in Weeks v. United States21
and expanded in Wolf v. Colorado,22 became applicable to state governments
in Mapp v. Ohio.23 In Mapp, the Court suppressed evidence of obscene
material that police obtained from a warrantless search of Ms. Mapp’s home.24
The Court held that effective enforcement of the Fourth Amendment required
adherence to the exclusionary rule at both the state and federal level.25
B. Consent Search Exception
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence includes a well established exception that
law enforcement officers need not obtain a warrant if they receive consent
from the individual whose premises, effects, or person they seek to search.26
The consent must be voluntary, not forced or coerced.27 Courts determine
voluntariness by applying a “totality of the circumstances” test.28 Further, the
Supreme Court has upheld searches based on consent given by a third party
who has, or appears to have, joint authority over the premises.29
In United States v. Matock,30 police arrested a bank robbery suspect in his
front yard and placed him in a patrol car.31 Police officers then went to the
door of his home and received permission to search the premises from Gayle
Graff, a co-occupant of the house.32 The officers conducted a warrantless
search of the premises and found evidence of the robbery in the closet of the

18. See Mapp, 467 U.S. 643.
19. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984).
20. See, e.g., id.; Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656; Wolf, 338 U.S. at 31; Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392.
21. 232 U.S. 383.
22. 338 U.S. 25.
23. 367 U.S. 643.
24. Id. at 660.
25. Id. at 655.
26. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); Zap v. United States, 328
U.S. 624, 630 (1946); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946).
27. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 218.
28. See id. at 227; see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 547 (1980).
29. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164
(1974).
30. 415 U.S. 164.
31. Id. at 166.
32. Id.
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bedroom shared by Matlock and Graff.33 Matlock moved to suppress the
evidence at trial, claiming that police obtained it during an unreasonable search
in violation of the Fourth Amendment.34 The Court held that consent to a
warrantless search by an individual possessing joint authority over an area is
valid against an absent, non-consenting individual who shares the joint
authority.35 Additionally, the Court noted that joint authority does not rest
merely on the law of property, rather it depends on common access or control
over the area.36 Plainly stated, the Court held that consent from a co-occupant
allows police to search, so long as no other physically present occupants
object.
In Illinois v. Rodriguez,37 the Supreme Court further expanded the scope of
consent searches. Police arrived at Dorothy Jackson’s home, where her
daughter, Gail Fischer, showed signs of severe physical abuse.38 Fischer
informed the officers that her boyfriend, Rodriguez, assaulted her earlier that
day.39 She agreed to travel with the officers to the apartment where the assault
had taken place and to unlock the door with her key so that officers could
arrest Rodriguez.40 Several times, she referred to the apartment as “our”
apartment, and claimed to have clothes and furniture inside.41 Upon arrival at
the apartment, which the officers never secured a warrant to search, Fischer
gave the police permission to enter.42 Once inside, the officers found drugs
and drug paraphernalia in plain view and arrested the sleeping Rodriguez for
possession with intent to distribute.43 Rodriguez moved to have the evidence
suppressed, claiming that Fischer had moved out several weeks earlier and did
not have authority to consent to a search.44 The Court ruled that warrantless
entry is valid when based upon the consent of a third party whom the police,
at time of the entry, reasonably believe to possess common authority over the
premises, but who, in fact, does not.45
The Court reasoned that Fourth Amendment warrant exceptions have
historically required reasonableness and good faith, rather than complete
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 166-67.
Id. at 166.
Id. at 170.
Id. at 172 n.7.
497 U.S. 177 (1990).
Id. at 179.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 180.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 188-89.
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accuracy.46 Under the circumstances of the case, if the officers believed that
Fischer exercised joint authority as a co-occupant, then they did not search the
apartment unreasonably.47 The decision also stated that courts must judge
determinations of consent by an objective standard of reasonableness, using
the facts available to the officers at the moment of the consent.48
C. Application of Matlock Prior to the Court’s Decision in Randolph
After the Supreme Court’s ruling in Matlock, many lower courts broadly
interpreted its holding as allowing third-party consent searches in any situation
where the co-occupant seemed to have joint authority over the premises.49
Many of these cases upheld the third party’s consent over the objections of a
physically present co-tenant.50 Courts that ruled in this manner focused
primarily on Matlock’s reasoning that one who shares a home assumes the risk
that other co-occupant’s may consent to a search.51 These rulings gave little
consideration to the absence of the defendant in Matlock and the fact that the
co-occupant’s consent did not conflict with any express refusal by another
occupant.
III. Georgia v. Randolph
A. Facts of the Case
Scott Randolph and his wife Janet separated in late May 2001.52 Janet then
left the marital residence and took their son to stay with her parents in
Canada.53 At some point in early July, Janet returned to the marital
residence.54 On July 6, she informed the police that her husband took their son
away following a domestic dispute.55 After the officers arrived at the house,
Janet also complained that her husband used cocaine.56 After Scott returned
to the home, he explained to the officers that he took their son to a neighbor’s
46. Id. at 185.
47. Id. at 189.
48. Id. at 188.
49. See United States v. Morning, 64 F.3d 531 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Donlin, 982
F.2d 31 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Hendrix, 595 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir. 1979); United States
v. Sumlin, 567 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1977); Love v. State, 138 S.W.3d 676 (Ark. 2003); City of
Laramie v. Hysong, 808 P.2d 199 (Wyo. 1991).
50. See, e.g., Hendrix, 595 F.2d at 885; Sumlin, 567 F.2d at 686.
51. See, e.g., Morning, 64 F.3d at 534; Donlin, 982 F.2d at 33; Hendrix, 595 F.2d at 885.
52. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 106 (2006).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 107.
56. Id.
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house in order to prevent Janet from taking him out of the country again.57
When one of the officers accompanied Janet to reclaim her child, she again
complained about her husband’s drug use, while also volunteering that there
were “items of drug evidence” inside the house.58 An officer asked Scott for
permission to search the house, “which he unequivocally refused.”59 The
officer then turned to Janet for consent to search, which she gave.60 She
proceeded to lead the officers to an upstairs bedroom, which she identified as
Scott’s, where an officer “noticed a section of a drinking straw with a powdery
residue he suspected was cocaine.”61 The officer left the house to retrieve an
evidence bag from his car and to call the district attorney’s office.62 The
district attorney’s office told him to stop the search and apply for a warrant.63
Once officers obtained a search warrant, “they returned to the house and seized
further evidence of drug use, on the basis of which Scott Randolph was
indicted for possession of cocaine.”64
Scott moved to suppress the evidence, claiming that the warrantless search
of his room violated his Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable
searches.65 Scott argued that his express refusal negated the consent given by
his wife.66 The trial court denied the motion based on Janet’s common
authority to consent to the search.67 The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed,
and the Supreme Court of Georgia sustained their decision, claiming “the
consent to conduct a warrantless search of a residence given by one occupant
is not valid in the face of the refusal of another occupant who is physically
present at the scene to permit a warrantless search.”68
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari “to resolve a split of
authority on whether one occupant may give law enforcement effective
consent to search shared premises, as against a co-tenant who is present and
states a refusal to permit the search.”69

57. Id.
58. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 107-08.
68. Id. at 108 (quoting State v. Randolph, 604 S.E.2d 835, 836 (Ga. 2004)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
69. Id.
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B. The Majority Opinion
The Court held that a present and objecting co-tenant’s refusal to permit a
search prevails, rendering the warrantless search unreasonable as to the
objecting co-tenant.70 Consequently, the Court found the warrantless search
of Scott Randolph’s house, over his express refusal, unreasonable and
therefore unconstitutional.71 The Court affirmed the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Georgia which excluded the section of straw obtained during the
search.72
Writing for the majority, Justice Souter claims that searches based upon
third-party consent represents an established exception to the warrant
requirement.73 None of the Court’s previous cases, however, involved the
situation of a physically present co-occupant objecting to a search.74 This
presence of an objecting co-occupant served as the Court’s basis for
distinguishing this case from Matlock and other instances of co-occupant
consent.75 The Court states that “Fourth Amendment rights are not limited by
the law of property,” and that a co-occupant’s common authority “is not
synonymous with a technical property interest.”76 Instead, reasonableness
governs the Fourth Amendment, and reasonableness relies largely on social
expectations.77 The Court states that its decision in Matlock relied on the
understanding that co-occupants live together with the assumption that one
may admit an unwanted visitor in the other’s absence, including the police.78
Therefore, the police acted reasonably in searching the house after obtaining
the consent of one co-occupant in the other occupant’s absence.79 The Court
reasons that no common understanding or expectation existed to support the
contention that one co-occupant “has a right or authority to prevail over the
express wishes of another, whether the issue is the color of the curtains or
invitations to outsiders.”80 Further, the Court holds that because one cotenant
has “no recognized authority in law or social practice”81 to admit a third party
into the shared residence over a present and objecting co-occupant, the consent
of the other occupant gives the police “no better claim to reasonableness in
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 106.
Id.
Id. at 123.
Id. at 113.
Id. at 109.
Id. at 110.
Id.
Id. at 111.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 114.
Id.
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entering than the officer would have in the absence of any consent at all.”82
The Court makes reference to the special protection of privacy the home has
always received from the courts, pointing to “the ancient adage that a man’s
house is his castle.”83 The Court states that disputed permission to search does
not outweigh the protection of privacy inside the home, which embodies the
central value of the Fourth Amendment.84
The majority opinion recognizes that a co-occupant has an interest in
bringing to light the criminal activities of another occupant.85 Yet, the
majority claims that alternative ways exist to achieve this goal without
disregarding a co-occupant’s refusal to allow a warrantless search.86 For
example, a co-occupant may independently bring evidence to police who can
use the evidence to obtain a warrant.87 The majority realizes that this rule
might easily make evidence inside a home inaccessible in situations lacking
sufficient probable cause to secure a search warrant.88 Nevertheless, the
unfortunate consequence of evidence occasionally eluding police does not
outweigh the value placed on requiring officers to have clear justification
before entering the home.89
C. Dissenting Opinions
Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas dissented from the
majority opinion.90 Roberts’ dissent, which Scalia joined, criticizes the
majority’s rule, claiming that it protects privacy only on a “random and
happenstance basis.”91 This occurs because the rule protects the privacy of a
co-occupant who happens to be at the front door when another occupant
consents, but will not protect a co-occupant momentarily away from the home
or napping in the next room.92 Roberts writes that “[u]sually when the
development of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence leads to such arbitrary lines,
we take it as a signal that the rules need to be rethought.”93

82. Id.
83. Id. at 115 (quoting Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 115-16.
86. Id. at 116.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 120.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 105.
91. Id. at 127 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 137.
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Roberts’s dissent argues that the correct rule would state that “[a]
warrantless search is reasonable if police obtain the voluntary consent of a
person authorized to give it,” even in the face of a present and objecting cooccupant.94 He comes to this conclusion based on the understanding that when
an individual shares things or places with another, the individual assumes the
risk that the other person will possibly share access to those things or places
with the government.95 Roberts disagrees with the majority’s view on social
expectations, claiming that a constitutional rule should not emanate from
social expectations, but instead from a legitimate expectation of privacy, which
individuals knowingly risk losing when they share things with other
individuals.96 He cites cases involving a locker, duffel bag, and a conversation
where courts ruled that individuals had assumed the risk of losing their privacy
rights by sharing with other individuals, and thereby, claimed that searches of
shared living spaces should receive similar treatment.97
Roberts also expresses concern that the new rule may deprive innocent cooccupants the opportunity to disassociate themselves from criminal activity
because the other occupant will simply refuse the police’s search request.98
Moreover, he claims the rule will effectively render police helpless to stop a
threat of domestic violence, as the abuser will deny them entry and the police
might not otherwise have sufficient cause or exigency to enter the premises.99
Justice Thomas dissents because he does not believe that a search
occurred.100 He claims that Coolidge v. New Hampshire101 “squarely controls
this case,” and that no Fourth Amendment search had taken place because
Janet Randolph led police directly to the evidence.102 He claims that the Court
need not address the issue of whether Janet’s consent authorized the
warrantless search.103 Janet, Thomas explains, did not act as an agent of the
police when she led them to the evidence, and the Fourth Amendment only
applies to government agents. Therefore, Thomas argues that this case did not
implicate the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures, and the evidence was admissible.104

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 128.
Id.
Id. at 131.
Id. at 131-33.
Id. at 138.
Id. at 139-40.
Id. at 145 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
403 U.S. 443 (1971).
Randolph, 547 U.S. at 145 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 145-48.
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IV. Analysis
The Supreme Court’s decision in Randolph illustrates both a deliberate and
curious application of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The Court astutely
recognizes that the presence of an objecting co-occupant distinguishes
Randolph from the situation in United States v. Matlock,105 and therefore,
required the Court to conduct a traditional Fourth Amendment analysis. The
decision clarifies any ambiguity present in Matlock regarding third-party
consent,106 upholds traditional Fourth Amendment privacy rights, and supplies
police with a bright-line rule. Indeed, the Court’s ruling inculcates all of these
advantages without disturbing its previous holdings in Matlock and Illinois v.
Rodriguez.107 Nevertheless, the Court inexplicably failed to address the
fundamental and dispositive issue of whether Janet Randolph shared common
authority over the bedroom. Despite this major oversight, the Court ultimately
reached the correct conclusion. By refusing to allow searches based on
disputed consent, the Supreme Court reclaims crucial privacy rights that broad
interpretations of Matlock by lower courts had diminished.108 Most
importantly, the Court reinforces the general warrant requirement for searches
and the heightened degree of privacy given to the home.
A. Continuation of the Warrant Requirement
The Court’s decision in Randolph, declaring searches based on disputed
consent unreasonable, affirms the Court’s long-held preference for searches
authorized by warrants over “the hurried action of officers.”109 Searches based
on disputed consent do not represent one of the “few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions”110 to the warrant requirement.111 In Matlock,
the Court specifically limited its holding, describing the cotenant’s consent as
only valid against “the absent, nonconsenting person.”112 Therefore, since no
established exception to the warrant requirement applied in Randolph, the
majority took the correct approach of considering the warrantless search
unreasonable unless outweighed by countervailing constitutional interests.
In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts argues that the interest in protecting
victims of spousal abuse should outweigh the requirement of a warrant in the
105.
106.
text.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

415 U.S. 164 (1974).
Most courts had interpreted Matlock broadly. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying
497 U.S. 177 (1990).
See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974).
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circumstance of disputed consent.113 Roberts harbors concern that the
majority’s rule would force police to stand outside a residence unable to help
a suspected victim of abuse, because the abuser’s objection to police entry
would negate the victim’s consent.114 As the majority emphasizes, however,
Roberts fails to distinguish the concept of police entry based on consent from
entry based on exigent circumstances.115 The exception to warrants based on
exigency is separate and unrelated to the consent exception.116 Courts have
consistently held that the threat of immediate harm to an individual justifies
warrantless entry based on exigency.117 Thus, if police have reason to believe
a threat of violence exists, they may enter a residence to protect an occupant
from domestic abuse, regardless of whether they have a warrant or consent.
The state of Georgia advanced an equally unconvincing argument, claiming
that a consenting co-tenant’s interest in bringing criminal activity to light
should outweigh the Fourth Amendment’s general warrant requirement.118 As
the majority points out, the co-tenant can act independently to deliver evidence
to the police or give them information to help obtain probable cause for a
warrant.119 Either option achieves the cotenant’s goal without violating
fundamental Fourth Amendment values. Therefore, none of the countervailing
interests presented outweighed the Fourth Amendment interest in protecting
individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures.120
B. Greater Protection for the Home
The Court’s decision in Randolph adheres to “the ancient adage that a
man’s house is his castle.”121 In Payton v. New York, the Court declared that
“the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house.”122
The “reasonable expectation of privacy” doctrine,123 drawn from Katz, further
supports the tradition of granting the home heightened Fourth Amendment
protection. Under the two-pronged Katz analysis, no location would receive
113. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 127 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 139.
115. Id. at 118-19 (majority opinion).
116. Compare United States v. Costa, 356 F. Supp. 606 (D.D.C. 1973) (exception to the
warrant requirement based on exigency), with Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)
(exception based on consent).
117. See, e.g., United States v. Hendrix, 595 F.2d 883, 885-86 (D.C. Cir. 1979); People v.
Sanders, 904 P.2d 1311, 1313-15 (Colo. 1995).
118. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 116.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958).
122. 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980).
123. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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a greater expectation of privacy than an individual’s home. Therefore,
allowing a search of an individual’s home over his express objection would
violate traditional Fourth Amendment privacy protections.
Chief Justice Roberts presents the strongest case against such heightened
protection of the home in his “assumption of the risk” argument. Roberts
asserts that the Fourth Amendment only protects against “unreasonable”
searches.124 He argues that the consent of a co-tenant makes a search
reasonable because the objecting tenant assumed the risk that “those who have
access to and control over his shared property might consent to a search.”125
Roberts supports his argument with several cases where the Court upheld
searches based on third-party consent because the individual had assumed the
risk of a search by sharing space or information with a third-party.126 Roberts
cites Frazier v. Cupp127 as a prime example of the Court’s application of the
“assumption of the risk” analysis. In Frazier, the Court held that by sharing
his duffel bag with his cousin, the defendant assumed the risk that his cousin
would allow someone to look inside.128 Roberts claims that this same
reasoning also applied to shared living space.129 He relies largely on the
Court’s statement in Matlock that co-occupants have “assumed the risk that
one of their number might permit [a] common area to be searched.”130
Although Chief Justice Roberts correctly analyzes how the Court has
deemed individuals to “assume the risk” when they share things or ideas with
a third party, he fails to realize that, as a product of the heightened protection
the Court has given to the home, this same analysis cannot be identically
applied to a residence. In Minnesota v. Carter, Justice Kennedy declared that
“it is beyond a dispute that the home is entitled to special protection as the
center of the private lives of our people.”131 By equating a duffel bag or phone
conversation with an individual’s home, Roberts ignores firmly rooted
precedent that accords the home greater protection under the Fourth
Amendment than other places or things.132 None of the examples cited by
Roberts involve the “assumption of the risk” analysis as it pertains to the
home.
124. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 130-31 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 134.
126. Id. at 131-35.
127. 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
128. Id. at 740.
129. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 133 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
130. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974).
131. 525 U.S. 83, 99 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
132. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 610 (1999); Carter, 525 U.S. at 99 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980); United States v. U.S. Dist. Court,
407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958).
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Nevertheless, an individual who chooses to share living space with another
does assume some degree of risk. As stated in Matlock, co-occupants assume
the risk that another occupant might permit a search of a common area.133 The
risk assumed, however, is the risk that a co-occupant might permit a search of
the premises during the occupant’s absence, and not the risk of a search taking
place over his present objection.134 A co-occupant’s expectation of privacy in
the home only diminishes when he chooses to leave the home, knowing that
other occupants may allow someone into the shared premises. On the other
hand, when a co-occupant remains at home, he assumes no risk of losing
control over access to the residence and thus retains the same expectation of
privacy as if he lived alone.
C. Examination of the Court’s Alternatives
Fundamentally, the Court’s decision upholds core Fourth Amendment
values. Nevertheless, Chief Justice Roberts indicates that the decision seemed
to provide protection “on a random and happenstance basis” by protecting an
objecting co-occupant who happened to be at home but not a co-occupant who
left the home momentarily.135 Indeed, the Randolph majority admits that “a
fine line” has been drawn by factually distinguishing Randolph from
Matlock.136 Even so, a brief discussion of the Court’s alternatives
demonstrates why concern for efficiency and Fourth Amendment privacy
rights prevented the Court from reaching any other decision.
1. Option 1: Never Allow Third-Party Consent Searches
The Randolph Court could have chosen to never allow third-party consent
searches. This option would uphold the Fourth Amendment interest in
protecting individuals from unreasonable searches, but, as previously
discussed, third-party consent searches have long existed as an exception to the
warrant requirement.137 Consequently, prohibiting third-party consent searches
would contradict years of precedent. Furthermore, this rule would burden law
enforcement and the courts by requiring an extraordinary amount of time and
work, especially since consent forms the basis of a large number of searches.138
Despite the possibility of expediting the search through a third party’s consent,
this rule would require officers to undergo the lengthy process of producing
an affidavit demonstrating probable cause for the search, submitting it to a
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7.
4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.3(d), at 155-62 (4th ed. 2004).
Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 127 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 121 (majority opinion).
See supra text accompanying note 29.
See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 122 n.9.
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magistrate, and waiting for the magistrate to issue a search warrant.
Meanwhile, the third party might have voluntarily permitted a search of the
premises the entire time. Moreover, in many situations, officers requesting
consent to search do not have enough factual information to secure a search
warrant. Therefore, the only means for obtaining authority to search for the
suspected evidence originates from the consent of a co-occupant. Placing an
absolute prohibition on third-party consent searches would leave law
enforcement officers with no way to collect the evidence. Consequently, fewer
criminals would be brought to justice. Prohibiting third-party consent searches
fails as a viable alternative because such policy abandons the traditional
exception and would not engender efficient or effective use of law
enforcement resources.
2. Option 2: Always Allow Third-Party Consent Searches, Even When
Disputed
Alternatively, the Court could have chosen to always allow third-party
consent searches, even over the objections of a physically present co-occupant.
Although this alternative provides a more convenient rule for law enforcement,
it violates fundamental Fourth Amendment values. The Court has repeatedly
held that “physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the
wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed . . . .”139 Allowing warrantless
searches based on disputed consent would require an individual who shares a
home to relinquish all expectations of privacy in the shared quarters. This
result conflicts with the Court’s declaration in Payton that nowhere “is the
zone of privacy more clearly defined than . . . [the] home.”140 Certainly, the
Court did not intend for the home’s “zone of privacy” to only protect
individuals who live alone. Consequently, this option utterly fails to protect
individuals’ constitutionally guaranteed privacy rights.
3. The Court’s Rule: Simple Yet Effective
The Georgia v. Randolph rule protects the heightened privacy rights
traditionally given to the home while honoring the established exception for
searches based on third-party consent. Further, the Court’s rule has the added
benefit of supplying law enforcement with a bright-line rule to guide their
search policies. Plainly stated, if any occupant objects to the search, officers
must stop and obtain a warrant before proceeding. The Court expressly held
that police have no obligation to seek out potential objectors;141 therefore, if
139. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
140. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980).
141. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 122.
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no present occupants object, the traditional rule allowing third-party consent
searches applies. The Court’s rule does draw a “fine line” by applying
different requirements to the situations encountered in Matlock and Randolph.
This differentiation, however, flows naturally from the understanding that the
presence of an objecting tenant fundamentally changes the constitutional
analysis. As a result of this change, “there is practical value in the simple
clarity of complementary rules . . . .”142
D. Disputed Consent Was an Unnecessary Issue.
Although the Court arrives at the correct decision regarding disputed
consent, the Court should never have reached the issue because Janet
Randolph had no authority to consent to the search. Consent to search may
only be given by an individual who has joint authority or common control over
the particular area to be searched.143 Janet and Scott Randolph were separated
and Janet moved out of the marital residence over a month before the search
occurred.144 She apparently returned to the home for the limited purpose of
collecting her remaining belongings.145 The police acquired this information
while attempting to resolve the Randolphs’ dispute prior to the search of the
bedroom.146 Furthermore, as she lead police to the bedroom where the search
occurred, Janet identified the room as “Scott’s” and never referred to it as
“mine” or “ours.”147 The officers should have recognized Janet’s questionable
relationship to the bedroom and conducted a more thorough investigation
before searching based on her consent. The good faith mistake exception
articulated in Rodriguez would not salvage the evidence seized, because
Rodriguez requires police to reasonably believe that the individual has
common authority.148 In this case, police had a substantial amount of
information indicating that Janet did not possess joint authority over the
bedroom. Therefore, they could not claim that they reasonably believed
Janet’s consent to be valid.149
The Court’s deliberate treatment of the common authority issue in Matlock
and Rodriguez makes its failure to address the issue in Randolph even more
perplexing. In Matlock, the Court devoted a substantial part of its opinion to
142. Id. at 121.
143. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974).
144. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 106.
145. Brief of Amicus Curiae Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers Supporting
Respondent at 3, Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (No. 04-1067), 2005 WL 2147326.
146. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 106.
147. Id. at 107.
148. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185-86 (1990).
149. Randolph, 544 U.S. 106-08.
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the discussion of whether the defendant’s girlfriend had authority to consent
to a search of their shared bedroom.150 The Rodriguez decision contained a
similar lengthy analysis of the common authority issue.151 In contrast, the
Court in Randolph treated the common authority issue as a foregone
conclusion.152 The Court seemed so focused on setting precedent for the
disputed consent issue that they overlooked the more basic issue of whether
Janet actually had common authority. Although generally upheld, consent
from a spouse only authorizes a search if the spouse has common control over
the specific area or effects.153 Even if the Court determined that Scott did not
possess sole authority over the bedroom, it could not deny that Janet had an
inferior interest in the bedroom since she had lived with her parents for over
a month. Thus, her consent would remain invalid because an objection by an
individual with a superior interest trumps consent given by a person with a
lesser interest.154 Fortunately, the Court’s oversight did not affect the final
outcome of the case. Nevertheless, the Court inexplicably failed to address an
essential issue in third-party consent searches.
Justice Thomas believes that no governmental search took place, rendering
the issue of disputed consent irrelevant.155 Citing Coolidge156 as the
controlling case, Thomas claims that Janet Randolph delivered evidence to the
police on her own accord, therefore not implicating Fourth Amendment
protections.157 In Coolidge, the defendant’s wife retrieved the evidence from
the bedroom closet and physically handed it over to the officers.158 In contrast,
Janet simply led police to the bedroom where the drug evidence was located.159
Janet neither assisted officers in the search, nor did she instruct the officers as
to what type of drug evidence she believed they would find.160 In Randolph,
police action, not the actions of Janet, led to the discovery of evidence, thus

150. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 167-77 (1974).
151. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 183-90.
152. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 106-09.
153. See State v. Evans, 372 P.2d 365, 372-73 (Haw. 1962).
154. See LAFAVE, supra note 134, § 8.3(d), at 160 (“[A]n objection by the person with the
superior interest would prevail over a consent given by a person with a lesser interest.”); see
also Lucero v. Donovan, 354 F.2d 16, 20-21 (9th Cir. 1965) (holding that a visitor’s consent
was not valid over a resident’s objection).
155. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 145 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
156. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (holding that when the spouse of the
defendant delivered evidence to police officers on her own free will it did not constitute a
Fourth Amendment search).
157. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 146 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
158. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 486.
159. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 107.
160. Id.
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invoking the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches.
Thomas’s contention that no search occurred would only hold true if Janet had
personally delivered the cocaine-laced straw to the officers before they
searched the home. Thomas correctly identifies the issue of disputed consent
as irrelevant, but he employs the wrong reasoning to supporting his argument.
V. Impact of Georgia v. Randolph on Courts and Law Enforcement
Despite the limited nature of the holding in Randolph, the decision will
have a large impact on courts, police, and citizens. Because the majority of
courts read Matlock as allowing searches based on disputed consent, courts
should expect an onslaught of appeals and petitions for writs of habeas corpus
from individuals convicted under the previous rule. Courts will have to
determine to what extent they will apply Randolph retroactively. Additionally,
given the limited scope of Randolph’s rule, overzealous police officers will
inevitably attempt to circumvent the new rule. While Randolph definitively
put to rest the issue of disputed consent, the decision leaves courts with a
whole new array of issues to address.
A. Will Courts Apply the Rule Retroactively?
The Randolph decision included no ruling on the matter of retroactive
effect. The Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retroactive operation of
a new or overruling decision.161 Courts have a variety of options when dealing
with retroactivity, ranging from no effect whatsoever162 to full effect, even in
cases that have already entered final judgments.163 Generally, courts do not
apply new rules of criminal procedure established by a Supreme Court
decision retroactively to cases that became final prior to the decision’s
announcement,164 especially in cases involving issues of illegal searches or
seizures.165 In the early stages, courts have applied the Randolph decision in
this manner. Courts have extended the benefits of the new rule to defendants
with pending appeals,166 while denying writs of habeas corpus to defendants
161. S.R. Shapiro, Annotation, Prospective or Retroactive Operation of Overuling Decision,
10 A.L.R.3D 1371, § 6, at 1391 (1966).
162. Id. § 7(a), at 1393-95.
163. Id.; id. § 8(a), at 1397-99.
164. United States v. Brown, 305 F.3d 304, 306 (5th Cir. 2002).
165. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (stating that as long as a state prisoner got a fair
chance to argue that evidence was a result of an illegal search or seizure, the prisoner cannot
make this argument later in a habeas petition, even if the federal court is convinced that the state
court reached the wrong conclusion).
166. See United States v. Diaz, 199 F. App’x 604 (9th Cir. 2006) (mem.); United States v.
Marasco, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (D. Neb. 2006), rev’d in part, 487 F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 2007);

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2007

644

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:627

who exhausted their appeals before the ruling.167 Most likely, for a collateral
review to succeed, the Supreme Court itself would have to make its ruling
retroactive to cases already final at the time of the decision. Currently, the
Supreme Court has made no indication that the Randolph decision should
apply retroactively to cases on collateral review.168
B. Potential for Abuse of the New Rule
In Randolph, the Supreme Court set out a bright-line rule regarding disputed
consent, however, opportunities still exist for abuse of the rule by law
enforcement. Two tactics which police might employ in order to bypass the
new rule immediately stand out. First, police could remove the potentially
objecting occupant from the home in an effort to deprive him of the
opportunity to refuse the search. Second, police might seek consent to search
at a time when they know the potentially objecting occupant has left the home.
The courts must limit these potential tactics by examining the officers’ conduct
under the “totality of the circumstances” test to determine whether their actions
were in good faith or deliberately aimed at avoiding the new rule.
Several courts have already confronted the issue of officers removing a
potentially objecting occupant and subsequently acquiring consent to search
from a co-occupant.169 Even though the majority of courts have found that the
occupant’s removal comported with valid law enforcement objectives,170 they
have also exhibited an awareness of the potential for abuse in these situations.
In a few instances, courts have excluded evidence when avoidance of the new
rule, rather than legitimate law enforcement concerns, clearly motivated police
action.171
In contrast, courts will likely show reluctance to suppress evidence based
upon consent obtained at a time when the police know the potentially
objecting tenant is away from the home. In Commonwealth v. Yancoskie, the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania found that the officers deliberately timed their
visit to coincide with the defendant’s fishing trip and received consent from
United States v. Sims, 435 F. Supp. 2d 542 (S.D. Miss. 2006).
167. Love v. Norris, No. 5:04CV00122-WRW, 2006 WL 2381838, at *11 (E.D. Ark. Aug.
17, 2006).
168. Id. at *15.
169. See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 469 F.3d 1074, (7th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Brown, No. 1:06-CR-168 WSD, 2006 WL 3760383 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 19, 2006); United States
v. Williams, No. 06-20051-B, 2006 WL 3151548 (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 1, 2006); People v.
Lapworth, 730 N.W.2d 258 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006).
170. See, e.g., Parker, 469 F.3d 1074; Brown, 2006 WL 3760383; Williams, 2006 WL
3151548; Lapworth, 730 N.W.2d 258.
171. United States v. Hudspeth, 459 F.3d 922, 931 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Henderson, No. 04 CR 697, 2006 WL 3469538, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2006) (mem.).
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his wife to search the home.172 The court refused, however, to suppress the
evidence resulting from the search, claiming that, because the defendant left
voluntarily, he assumed the risk of his wife consenting to the search.173 Given
that Randolph leaves the holding of Matlock undisturbed, and given that
Randolph places no affirmative requirement on officers to seek out potentially
objecting co-tenants,174 many courts will probably adopt the view articulated
by the Pennsylvania court. In order for evidence to be suppressed under this
scenario, the courts will likely require a showing that police coerced the
defendant into leaving the home for the purpose of obtaining consent from
another occupant.
VI. Conclusion
In Georgia v. Randolph, the Court establishes a bright-line rule prohibiting
searches based on disputed consent. The Court’s decision in Randolph leaves
its prior decision in Matlock undisturbed, but limits the scope of Matlock’s
holding to situations where no physically present co-occupant objects to the
search. By doing so, the Court preserves the heightened expectation of
privacy individuals exhibit in their home. Furthermore, in an area of law
where the exceptions nearly swallow the rule,175 Randolph reinforces the
tradition of presuming warrantless searches unreasonable unless proven
otherwise. Because of the limited nature of the Court’s holding, lower courts
must make a conscious effort to prevent law enforcement from avoiding the
scope of Randolph’s rule. Otherwise, individuals will never receive the full
protection the rule intends to provide. Although the Court’s failure to address
the issue of Janet Randolph’s common authority over the bedroom created a
somewhat flawed analysis, the Court came to the correct conclusion. Indeed,
“[d]isputed permission is [] no match for this central value of the Fourth
Amendment . . . .”176
Kyle Evans

172. 915 A.2d 111, 115 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).
173. Id.
174. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 122 (2006).
175. See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001) (exigent circumstances exception); New
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (automobile exception); United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218 (1973) (search incident to arrest exception); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and
frisk exception).
176. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 115.
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